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1 ABSTRACT
Tor is the most widely used anonymity network, currently serving
millions of users each day. However, there is no access control in
place for all these users, leaving the network vulnerable to botnet
abuse and attacks. For example, criminals frequently use exit re-
lays as stepping stones for attacks, causing service providers to
serve CAPTCHAs to exit relay IP addresses or blacklisting them
altogether, which leads to severe usability issues for legitimate
Tor users. To address this problem, we propose TorPolice, the first
privacy-preserving access control framework for Tor. TorPolice
enables abuse-plagued service providers such as Yelp to enforce ac-
cess rules to police and throttle malicious requests coming from Tor
while still providing service to legitimate Tor users. Further, Tor-
Police equips Tor with global access control for relays, enhancing
Tor’s resilience to botnet abuse. We show that TorPolice preserves
the privacy of Tor users, implement a prototype of TorPolice, and
perform extensive evaluations to validate our design goals.
2 INTRODUCTION
In an era of mass surveillance, our online communications are
being increasingly monitored by businesses and government en-
tities to infer sensitive information. Technologies for anonymous
communication aim to hide users’ network identity (IP address)
from untrusted destinations, as well as third parties on the Inter-
net [3, 9, 25, 58]. Counting almost two million daily users, the Tor
network [9] is among the most popular digital privacy tools. As of
May 2017, the network consists of over 7,000 volunteer-run relays,
carrying nearly 100 Gbps of traffic [11]. Tor clients1 build a path
(also known as Tor circuit) consisting of three relays (guard, middle
and exit) to reach service providers such as Yelp orWikipedia. Tor is
used by law enforcement, intelligence agencies, political dissidents,
journalists, whistle-blowers, businesses, and ordinary citizens to
enhance their online privacy [12].
Today’s Tor network does not implement any access control
mechanism, meaning that anyone with a Tor client can use the
network without limitation. While the lack of access control fosters
∗The initial version is published in IEEE ICNP 2017 [50], titled “TorPolice: Towards
Enforcing Service-Defined Access Policies for Anonymous Communication in the Tor
Network”.
1In this paper, we use the term client(s) to refer to the onion proxy (OP) software
running on the Tor user’s machine.
network growth, it has also caused various problems, most impor-
tantly botnet abuse [37]. In practice, botnets use Tor to attack third-
party services, spam comment sections on websites, scrape content,
and scan services for vulnerabilities [57]. In response, many service
providers and content delivery networks (CDNs) have started to
treat Tor users as “second-class" Web citizens [46], by either forcing
Tor users to solve numerous CAPTCHAs [56, 57] or blocking Tor
exit relay IP addresses altogether.
Another type of botnet-related abuse of Tor arises from com-
mand and control (C&C) servers run as Tor onion services (used to
be known as hidden services) [21, 28, 32]. In the past, such events
caused a rapid spike in the number of Tor clients [1, 38]. Besides
the reputational issue of Tor “hosting” botnet infrastructure, the
massive number of circuit creation requests from botnets is a heavy
burden on Tor relays, causing significant performance degradation
for legitimate Tor users (e.g., frequent Tor circuit failures). Other
types of botnet abuse include paralyzing Tor relays via relay flood-
ing attacks [14, 15] and performing large-scale traffic analysis via
throughput or congestion fingerprinting [52, 54].
Contributions. In this paper, we present TorPolice, the first privacy-
preserving access control framework for the Tor network. Lever-
aging cryptographically computed network capabilities, TorPolice
enables service providers to define access policies for Tor connec-
tions, allowing them to throttle Tor-emitted abusewhile still serving
legitimate Tor users. Thus, TorPolice offers a more viable alterna-
tive to abuse-plagued service providers than simply blocking all
Tor connections. Further, TorPolice improves the Tor network’s
resilience to various botnet abuses by enabling global access control
for Tor relays. Crucially, TorPolice achieves these benefits while
still retaining Tor’s anonymity guarantees.
TorPolice’s design introduces a set of fully distributed and par-
tially trusted access authorities (AAs) to manage and certify capabil-
ities. To request capabilities from AAs, Tor clients must first obtain
anonymous capability seeds which are types of resources that are
costly to scale. Both service providers and the Tor network provide
differentiated service to Tor clients that possess valid capabilities so
to enforce self-defined access rules. The AAs generate capabilities
using blind signatures [17] to break the linkability between capa-
bility requesting and capability spending. We conduct a rigorous
security analysis to prove that TorPolice does not weaken privacy
guarantees offered by the current Tor network.
We implement a prototype of TorPolice to demonstrate its prac-
ticality and evaluate the prototype extensively on our testbed, in
the Shadow simulator [40], via simulations and over the live Tor
network. Our results show that TorPolice can effectively enforce
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service-selected access policies and mitigate large-scale botnet
abuses against Tor at the cost of negligible overhead.
We structure the rest of our paper as follows. We begin by out-
lining our problem statement in § 3, followed by a design overview
in § 4. The details behind access authorities are in § 5. Next, § 6
discusses how TorPolice can control site access while § 7 discusses
how we can control access to the network itself. We analyze TorPo-
lice’s effect on Tor’s anonymity in § 8, discuss its implementation
in § 9, and evaluate it in § 10. Finally, we present related work in
§ 11 and conclude our work in § 12.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we provide brief background on the Tor network
(§ 3.1), outline TorPolice’s design goals (§ 3.2), and discuss our threat
model (§ 3.3).
3.1 Tor Background
Tor clients anonymously connect to service providers (e.g., Wik-
iLeaks) by building three-hop circuits consisting of a guard, middle,
and exit relay. Tor’s use of layered encryption ensures that each
relay only knows the identities of its direct neighbors (i.e., the pre-
vious and next hop in the circuit). Clients randomly select these
relays, weighted by the relays’ bandwidth and their positions on the
circuit. A list of all Tor relays—the network consensus—is published
hourly by a set of nine globally-distributed directory authorities
that are run by volunteers trusted by the Tor Project. While the
directory authorities and guard relays learn a Tor client’s network
identity (i.e., her IP address), they cannot observe the client’s online
activity. Exit relays, however, can monitor the client’s activity, but
do not know her identity. Tor’s anonymity stems from unlinking
network identity from activity.
Besides client-side anonymity, Tor allows service providers to
host their service anonymously over Tor onion services (OS). Once
an OS is set up, it creates circuits to at least three relays severing as
its introduction points (IPs). Then, the OS publishes its descriptor—
which contains the IPs—to a distributed hash table that consists of
a subset of all Tor relays. To connect to the OS, a Tor client first
fetches the OS’s descriptor using its onion address, and then builds
two circuits: one to an IP and another one to a randomly-selected
relay called the rendezvous point (RP). The client instructs the IP to
send the identity of the RP to the OS, which then creates a circuit
to the RP to be able to finally communicate with the client.
3.2 Design Goals
TorPolice adds access control to the anonymous communication in
Tor, benefiting both service providers and the Tor network. Different
from prior capability based schemes [48, 49, 55, 66, 67], TorPolice’s
design needs to address a unique combination of the following three
challenges: (i) preserving Tor’s anonymity guarantees, (ii) avoiding
central points of control, and (iii) being incrementally deployable.
Service-defined Access Policies. Project Honey Pot lists nearly
70% of all Tor exit relays as comment spammers [57], causing many
service providers and CDNs to block and filter traffic originating
from the Tor network. To reduce this tension between Tor users
and service providers, TorPolice must allow service providers to
define and enforce access rules for Tor connections, allowing them
to throttle Tor-emitted abuse while still serving legitimate Tor users.
TorPolice is a flexible framework that allows service providers to
define self-desired access policies.
Mitigate Botnet Abuse Against Tor. Being a service provider
itself, the Tor network is also subject to botnet abuse, such C&C
servers hosted as onion services, and (D)DoS attacks against (se-
lected) relays. TorPolice allows the Tor network to control the
network usage of Tor clients, making it possible to throttle the
abuse. In contrast to local rate limiting by each relay, TorPolice’s
access control mechanism is global, meaning that an adversary
cannot circumvent our defense by simply connecting to all relays.
Preserving Tor User Privacy. TorPolice must not degrade Tor’s
anonymity guarantees. While we add a new layer of functionality
to Tor (access control), this layer—like Tor itself—unlinks a client’s
identity from its activity, and therefore preserves Tor users’ online
anonymity.
Fully Distributed and Partially Trusted Authorities. In accor-
dance with Tor’s design philosophy of distributing trust, TorPolice
relies on a set of fully distributed and partially-trusted access au-
thorities (AAs) to manage capabilities. An AA is operated either by
the Tor Project, a service provider, or a trusted third party. Since
Tor clients are free to choose any AA to request capabilities, no
single AA has a global view on all Tor clients. Further, each AA
is only partially trusted and a service provider can blacklist any
misbehaving or compromised AA.
Incrementally Deployable. TorPolice must be incrementally de-
ployable. Up-to-date Tor clients, relays, and service providers can
benefit from a partially-deployed TorPolice immediately while out-
dated entities can continue their operations.
Elided Design Goals. Various attacks seek to break Tor’s unlinka-
bility. For instance, an AS-level adversary may de-anonymize a Tor
user’s Internet activities if the adversary is in a position to mon-
itor both ingress and egress traffic [62]. TorPolice is not designed
to mitigate those attacks on unlinkability. Instead, we preserve the
unlinkability guarantees that the Tor network currently provides.
3.3 Adversary Model and Assumptions
We consider a Byzantine adversary that deviates from our proto-
col and abuses Tor in arbitrary ways. The adversary can use Tor
to abuse third-party services, e.g., by scraping content, spamming
comments, and scanning for vulnerabilities. The adversary may
also abuse the Tor network directly, e.g., by using Tor OSes as C&C
servers, performing traffic analysis, or launching (D)DoS attacks
against Tor relays. The adversary may further control a large num-
ber of bots, and hence a significant amount of resources. The bots
can act passively (e.g., monitor Tor traffic) or actively (e.g., spoof
and manipulate packets).
We assume that the AAs are well-connected to the Internet
backbone so that volumetric DDoS attacks against the whole set
of AAs can be mitigated. Tor’s existing directory authorities are
subject to the same assumption. In practice, one way to assure this
assumption is relying on DDoS prevention vendors [49].
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Figure 1: The architecture of TorPolice. A Tor client (step 1) anony-
mously sends its capability seed to anAA to request pre-capabilities
(step 2), based onwhich the client computes site(relay)-specific capa-
bilities (step 3). The client then spends capabilities on either service
access or Tor circuit creation (step 4). The capability recipients vali-
date capabilities before allowing services (step 5). We intentionally
separate two capability use cases for clear presentation.
4 DESIGN OVERVIEW
In a nutshell, TorPolice is a generic access control framework based
on capabilities. TorPolice enables both service providers and the Tor
network itself to enforce access control on Tor clients to mitigate
various types of botnet abuse caused by the lack of access control.
To this end, we consider two types of capabilities: site-specific capa-
bilities for accessing TorPolice-enhanced service providers through
Tor, and relay-specific capabilities for creating TorPolice-enhanced
Tor circuits. Both types of capabilities are signed by a set of fully-
distributed Access Authorities (AAs) that are deployed either by the
Tor Project, service providers, or trusted third parties. To request
capabilities from a particular AA, a Tor client is required to possess
a capability seed—basically a costly-to-scale resource—accepted by
the AA. Each AA accepts only a single type of capability seed. Since
Tor clients are free to choose their AAs, no single AA has a global
view on all Tor clients. TorPolice employs blind signatures [17]
to unlink the requesting and spending of capabilities. When re-
questing capabilities from an AA, Tor clients express what kind of
capability they request because the issuing process for two capabil-
ity types differs. An AA maintains separate signing keys and rate
limiters for two capability types.
Figure 1 illustrates the capability requesting and spending pro-
cess. While both capability types have in common step one and two,
the subsequent steps differ. A site-specific capability can only be
spent at the service provider specified in the capability to request
service while a relay-specific capability is spent at a specific Tor
relay to build a TorPolice-enhanced circuit through the relay. A Tor
client can use both capability types simultaneously by visiting a
TorPolice-enhanced service provide through a TorPolice-enhanced
Tor circuit. In Figure 1, we intentionally separate our two capability
use cases for clear presentation.
5 THE ACCESS AUTHORITIES
TorPolice relies on a set of fully distributed and partially trusted
access authorities (AAs) to manage network capabilities.We assume
AAs to be honest-but-curious, meaning that they follow protocol,
but seek to derive additional information about Tor clients. An AA
can be deployed by the Tor Project, service providers (e.g., large
CDNs like Cloudflare), or third parties. Each AA is a conceptually
centralized entity. However, an AA can distribute its operations
among multiple servers to achieve high availability.
5.1 Capability Seeds
AAs expect valid capability seeds from Tor clients to issue pre-
capabilities, which are the basis for deriving spendable capabili-
ties. For flexibility, we intentionally keep the definition of capa-
bility seeds broad: any resource that is readily available to Tor
users, but costly to scale, can be adopted as capability seeds. Rea-
sonable choices include proof-of-work schemes (e.g., solutions to
CAPTCHAs or computational puzzles) and anonymous monetary
resources. TorPolice does not assume that capability seeds can dis-
tinguish bots from humans. Rather, botnets can still obtain more
capability seeds than legitimate Tor users. Instead, TorPolice em-
ploys capability seeds as a form of anonymous identities that enable
both service providers and the Tor network to control access by
each Tor client.
In this paper, we elaborate on two types of capability seeds (i.e.,
solutions to CAPTCHAs and computational puzzles) and further
discuss how TorPolice can incorporate more types of seeds in § 5.4.
One key challenge of using anonymous capability seeds is to ensure
that clients do not have to solve endless challenges while brows-
ing the web and meanwhile ensure their activities are unlinkable.
TorPolice proposes a capability renewal protocol to address this
challenge (§ 6.1).
Although CAPTCHAs can be deployed using publicly available
libraries like Google’s reCAPTCHA [31], TorPolice needs additional
components to support computational puzzles. At a very high level,
TorPolice’s puzzle system design is similar to Portcullis [55]. How-
ever, TorPolice’s puzzle system does make a great improvement
over Portcullis: it can explicitly bound the percentage of CPU cycles
that any client can spend on solving puzzles. As a result, the puzzle
system can bring all bots down to the percentage that normal users
prefer to use for puzzle computation, which significantly reduce
the computation disparity between the normal clients and bots. For
better readability, we defer detailed design for TorPolice’s puzzle
system in § 13.1.
5.2 Per-Seed Rate Limiting
Each AA accepts only one type of capability seed. The rate at which
a seed can request pre-capabilities is limited. In particular, an AA
publishes two rate limiters: one determines the maximum rate at
which a capability seed can request pre-capabilities used for ac-
cessing TorPolice-enhanced service providers and the other one
determines the maximum rate at which a seed can request pre-
capabilities used for TorPolice-enhanced circuit creation. Based
on these per-seed rate limiters published by all AAs, both service
providers and Tor can configure a set of rules to fulfill their access
policies. This paper presents two concrete examples. In § 6.3, we
elaborate on a design that enables a site to bound an adversary’s
achievable service request rate through Tor using self-defined pa-
rameters. In § 7.1, we present a design that allows Tor to prevent
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botnets from creating numerous Tor circuits to conduct various
abuses. To improve readability, detailed settings of these rate lim-
iters will be discussed when presenting these access policies.
5.3 Key Management
Each AA maintains two pairs of keys for signing pre-capabilities,
and each of them is dedicated for one capability type. Each AA
must publish the public key of both key pairs, for instance, via the
Tor network consensus, to ensure other entities (e.g., Tor clients,
relays and service providers) can verify the AA’s signatures. An AA
can periodically renew its keys, but at any time only two key pairs
from the AA are valid. After receiving signed pre-capabilities from
an AA, Tor clients must verify that the AA uses proper keys before
using the pre-capabilities for accessing service providers or Tor.
This prevents a malicious AA from using more keys simultaneously
to partition the anonymity set. Finally, each AA is associated with
a long-term fingerprint to uniquely identity the AA, similar to the
fingerprint of a Tor relay.
5.4 Extending the Access Authorities
Besides Tor, content delivery networks (e.g., Cloudflare or Akamai)
also have direct incentives to deploy and control their own set of
access authorities to mitigate Tor-emitted abuses while serving
anonymous connections. In fact, Cloudflare is working on an inde-
pendent implementation of a system whose design goals are similar
to our AAs [20], although they focus on addressing the usability
issues for Tor users when visiting Cloudflare-powered websites.
Finally, semi-trusted third parties such as social network oper-
ators (e.g., Google, Facebook, and Twitter), may also run access
authorities (shown as TTP AA in Figure 1) based on pre-agreed
terms. To prevent account information leakage to Tor and service
providers, Tor users only authenticate themselves to the social net-
work operators. Service providers or Tor only learn a single bit of
information: whether a Tor client has a valid account (i.e., capability
seed) or not.
6 TORPOLICE-ENHANCED SITE ACCESS
We now elaborate on the capability design for accessing TorPolice-
enhanced service providers such as websites. To mitigate the ten-
sion between service providers and Tor users, our key observation is
that service providers should not treat all connections from one Tor
exit relay equally since each exit relay is shared by many Tor users.
Instead, accountability should be enforced at the granularity of
Tor clients so that each service provider can throttle malicious Tor
clients without blocking legitimate Tor users. To this end, TorPolice
designs site-specific capabilities that allows a service provider to
enforce self-selected access rules on anonymous Tor connections.
6.1 Pre-capability Design
Before visiting a TorPolice-enhanced site, a Tor client must first
request pre-capabilities from an AA. The client is free to choose
any AA based on what capability seed the client prefers to give.
To request a pre-capability, the client (i) provides a valid capability
seed to its selected AA and (ii) provides blinded information for
the AA to compute pre-capabilities. The client can hide its network
identity from the AA, for instance, by using Tor.
Capability Seed Validation. Depending on the accepted type of
capability seed, an AA performs corresponding seed verification.
For instance, if an AA accepts proof-of-work schemes, it needs to
verify that solutions to the presented challenge are correct. Further,
an AA needs to ensure that the pre-capability request rates by any
capability seed does not exceed the two rate limiters discussed in
§ 5.2. Since each AA maintains separate rate limiters and signing
keys for two pre-capability types (i.e., either for TorPolice-enhanced
service access or for TorPolice-enhanced Tor circuit creation), Tor
clients must specify the pre-capability type in their requests (in this
section, it is for accessing service providers). In § 6.3, we will explain
how a site defines its access policies based on these pre-capability
release rate limiters published by all AAs.
InformationRequired toCompute Pre-capabilities.To request
pre-capabilities, the client provides its selected AA the following
set of information {S,n,Ts ,F }, where S is the domain name of site
that the client is going to visit, n is a 128-bit cryptographic nonce
generated by the client, Ts is a universally agreed timestamp to
indicate the freshness of the information and F is fingerprint of
the selected AA. All information is blinded [17] by the client to
avoid information leakage to the selected AA.
The set of information is designed to prevent abuse. In particular,
S is used to make the capability site-specific to prevent capability
double-spending at different sites. The nonce n is added to ensure
the uniqueness of each pre-capability, which in turn ensures the
uniqueness of each capability. The Ts indicates the freshness of
pre-capabilities so that expired ones are nullified automatically.
The client is required to use Tor’s daily generated fresh random
number [33] as Ts such that at any time all valid capabilities have
the exact same timestamp. This design eliminates the possibility
of information leakage cased by timestamp abuse. F is added to
allow other entities (i.e., clients, Tor relays and service providers)
to use correct public keys to verify signatures.
Computation. Upon validation of the client’s pre-capability re-
quest, the AA computes pre-capabilities using the blinded informa-
tion provided by the client. Pre-capabilities computed by an AAAi
are denoted by PAi . Then we have
PAi = {S | n | Ts | FAi }b | SbAi , (1)
where FAi is Ai ’s fingerprint, SbAi is Ai ’s blind signature over
the set of blinded information {S | n | Ts | FAi }b , and | represents
concatenation throughout the paper.
Pre-capability Renewal. One key challenge for designing pre-
capabilities is to ensure that Tor clients do not have to repeatedly
solve challenges when browsing the web. A strawman design is that
an AA can issue many (i.e., a few hundred) pre-capabilities for each
solved challenge. However, this strawman design has at least two
shortcomings: (i) it breaks the site-specific pre-capability design
since the client may not be able to forecast the sites that it is going
to visit so as to provide these blinded information immediately after
solving challenges; (ii) the design makes it easier for automated
bots to accumulate pre-capabilities, weakening the entire system.
To combat these problems, we propose a pre-capability renewal
protocol. In particular, when a client first presents its challenge
4
solution (i.e., capability seed) to an AA, the AA issues the client a un-
forgeable pseudonym I = {r | ϕ} where r is a random 128-bit nonce
and ϕ is the AA’s signature over r . Later on, the client presents I
as a proof of validation when requesting new pre-capabilities from
the AA, allowing the client to bypass future challenges. Not only
does the site-specific pre-capability design hold with this design,
but also the AA can account each pre-capability request on a spe-
cific solved challenge (i.e., capability seed) to enforce the per-seed
rate limiting described in § 5.2. Each pseudonym has a validation
period determined by the AA. Clients with expired pseudonyms
are required to solve new challenges to obtain new pseudonyms
that are unlinkable to previous ones.
Impact of the Pseudonym on Anonymity. Different from the prior
pseudonym-based anonymous blacklisting systems [18, 19], in
which a user interacts with a service provider using a persistent
pseudonym, the pseudonym in our pre-capability renewal protocol
is transient and never presented to both service providers and Tor
relays. The pseudonym in our protocol is only linked with a specific
challenge solution served as an anonymous capability seed. Since
a Tor client presents its pseudonym to an AA through Tor, the
AA cannot link the pseudonym with the client. Further, since all
site-related information sent to the AA is blinded, the pseudonym
is unlinkable with any site access as well. Thus, using pseudonym
in our protocol does not impact Tor users’ anonymity.
6.2 Site-specific Capability Design
After obtaining PAi , the Tor client unblinds the signature using
its secret blind factor to produce the unblinded version of the pre-
capability, which is the capability spendable at a specific site. In
particular,
C = S | n | Ts | FAi | SAi (2)
The capability C contains a set of unblinded information that
allows the site S to perform capability verification when the client
presents C to access the site, as detailed in § 6.3.
Employing blind signature is the key to ensure that TorPolice
preserves Tor’s privacy guarantee. First, signatures from the AAs
prevent unauthorized entities from issuing capabilities. Second,
using blind signature avoids disclosing any site-related information
to the AAs since the blinded information sent to the AAs is un-
linkable with the “plain” information produced by the client. Such
unlinkability further ensures the unlinkability between the client
and its capability spending even if the AAs could collude with the
site, which preserves online anonymity of Tor users. We provide a
formal security proof in § 8.
6.3 Site-Specific Capability Spending
Capability Validation. Tor clients spend site-specific capabilities
at TorPolice-enhanced sites to request services. Upon receiving
capabilities, a TorPolice-enhanced site first validates them before
subsequent processing. A site-specific capability is valid if (i) it
encloses an authentic signature from anAA; (ii) it encloses a domain
name that is consistent with the site; (iii) the capability is not expired
(i.e., Ts is the fresh random number released by Tor); and (iv) the
capability is not nullified by the site. If any of these conditions
does not hold, the site rejects this capability to deny access. If a
CDN provider (e.g., Cloudflare) processes capabilities on behalf of
its powered sites, the second rule is passed as long as the enclosed
domain is owned by one of the CDN provider’s customers. In the
fourth rule, whether a capability is nullified or not is decided by
the site’s access policies, as detailed below.
Site-Defined Access Policies. Once a site-specific capability is
validated, the site accepts the Tor client’s service request. Since
the major form of Tor abuse is that automated bots use Tor to con-
duct various malicious activities against the site [57] (e.g., content
scraping, vulnerability scanning, comment spamming and so forth),
the site needs to further control the number of service requests
(e.g., HTTP requests) allowed by each capability. We clarify that
each site can have its own definition of service requests. Once a Tor
client’s service request count exceeds a threshold, the site nullifies
the current capability and requires a new site-specific capability for
subsequent service requests. Recall that the pre-capability request
rate by each client is limited by the AAs through the per-seed rate
limiting design in § 5.2. Thus, together with these rate limiters, it is
possible for the site to design access policies so as to bound a strate-
gic adversary’s service request rate using self-selected parameters,
as detailed below.
Policy Definition. Assume the following set of access author-
ities {A0,A1, ...,An } are deployed, and each authority accepts
one type of capability seed. In this context, the site defines its ac-
cess policy as {w0,w1, ...,wn } where wi is the number of service
requests allowed by one valid site-specific capability issued by the
access authority Ai .
We now formulate {w0,w1, ...,wn } mathematically. We denote
the set of capability seeds by {s0, s1, ..., sn } and authority Aj ac-
cepts seed sj . Let c j denote the cost of obtaining a capability seed
sj . We denote the cost of obtaining one network identity (i.e., IP
address) by λ. Let r j denote the maximum rate at which a seed sj
can request pre-capabilities (for accessing service providers) from
authority Aj . Assume that for any client connecting to the site
directly without using Tor, the site allows a maximum service re-
quest rate O˜ before either blocking the client or forcing the client
to solve challenges. Then to bound a strategic adversary’s service
request rate by using Tor, the site derives {w0,w1, ...,wn } to ensure
that the following condition is satisfied for any set of parameters
[α0,α1, ...,αn ] where αi ∈ [0, 1] and ∑ni=0 αi = 1.
n∑
i=0
αi · λ
ci
· ri ·wi ≤ ϵ · O˜, (3)
where ϵ is a site-defined parameter.
Policy Correctness. The parameters [α0,α1, ...,αn ] represent
the adversary’s strategy of purchasing various types of capability
seeds. Thus, if formula (3) holds for any strategy, the site can guar-
antee that the maximum Tor-emitted service request rate achieved
by an adversary when spending λ on purchasing capability seeds
is no greater than ϵ · O˜. Thus, if an adversary that spends a certain
amount of resources on obtaining network identities can access the
site with rate O without using Tor, then the maximum rate that
the adversary can request service from the site by using Tor is no
greater than ϵ ·O, given that the adversary spends the same amount
of resources on acquiring capability seeds. Equivalently, in order to
achieve the same service request rate, the adversary has to spend
1/ϵ times as many resources when launching attacks through Tor
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as it spends when launching attacks natively without using Tor. To
ensure that formula (3) holds for any attacker strategy, we choose
wi ≤ ϵ · ci · O˜
λ · ri , ∀i ∈ [0,n] (4)
Policy Enforcement. If wi = 1, then each capability is usable
for exactly one service request. The site can enforce this by sup-
pressing service requests with duplicate capabilities, for example,
through the use of a Bloom filter. Ifwi > 1, then statistically more
than one service request should be allowed for each capability. To
enforce this, the site stops accepting a capability with probabil-
ity 1/wi , and then adds the capability to the duplicate suppressor.
However, multiple service requests carrying the same capability
can trivially be linked by the site. We discuss how to address this
issue through system parameterization below. Finally, if wi < 1,
then each capability is accepted with probability wi , and exactly
one service request is allowed for each accepted capability.
Policy Parameterization. We now discuss the parameteriza-
tion of wi . First, to compute wi , the site does not need to exactly
know ci . Instead, the site simply needs to assign specific weights to
these capability seeds based on its policies. Further, with an ideal
parameterization,wi should be exactly one since (i) no capability
is spendable on more than one service request to ensure unlink-
ability and (ii) no additional capabilities are required for a single
service request to avoid extra computation and networking over-
head. However, it is difficult to reach the ideal parameterization
since ri is chosen by the authority Ai that is unaware of the site’s
configurations ϵ and O˜. In addition, configurations can vary greatly
among different sites so that an ideal parameterization for one site
could be undesirable for others.
To address the problem, TorPolice sets ri such that (with high
probability) a Tor client can obtain enough capabilities so that it is
feasible for the client to present a unique capability for each TCP
connection to the site. This ensures that the client can achieve the
highest level of unlinkability offered by Tor, i.e., service providers
only see TCP connections from Tor exit relays. We clarify that it is
the client who determines how to spend its capabilities across TCP
connections (as described below). The above parameterization is
adopted only to ensure that spending a unique capability for each
TCP connection is a feasible strategy for the client. A reasonable
setting of ri can be estimated based on the live Tor measurement
in [42], which finds that during a 10-minute interval, each Tor
client opens about 24 web streams. In practice, the authority Ai
should enforce ri over a longer period of time (e.g., few hours) to
accommodate usage burst.
Note that when an AA Ak is deployed by the site itself, system
parameterization forAk is easier since the site determines the rate
limiters for issuing pre-capabilities.
Capability Spending by Tor Clients. Given ri , some sites may
end up with ruleswi > 1, i.e., one capability is allowed for multiple
service requests. In this case, the site needs to send a response to
indicate whether a capability is nullified or not. Tor clients are free
to determine their capability spending strategies. For instance, a
Tor client can sendwi service requests using the same capability
within a single TCP connection (due to HTTP keep-alive), which
still ensures the highest level of unlinkability. Or the client may
choose to spend one capability across multiple TCP connections
to allow trans-TCP linkability. We note that if a Tor client uses
the default setting of Tor Browser, it already allows trans-TCP
linkability since the Tor Browser uses session cookies. For a site
that has wi less than 1, it can enforce such policies by accepting
one capability with probabilitywi and for each accepted capability,
the site allows only one service request.
7 TORPOLICE-ENHANCED TOR ACCESS
In this section, we detail the capability design for accessing the
TorPolice-enhanced Tor network. The current Tor network suffers
from a variety of botnet abuses such as large scale C&C abuse [21, 28,
32, 37, 38], relay flooding attacks [14, 15] and traffic analysis [52, 54].
These abuses lead to various bad results, including poor system
performance for legitimate Tor users, de-anonymization threats
and bad reputation for Tor. The root cause of these attacks is that
botnets can create an arbitrary number of Tor circuits without any
limitation. Enforcing local rate limiting for circuit creation at each
relay is unlikely to stop these attacks since a strategic botnet can
instruct each bot to enumerate all relays to circumvent the local
rate limiting.
With TorPolice, Tor can globally control circuit creations by any
client using our capability scheme. In particular, when TorPolice
is activated, clients are required to possess valid capabilities in
order to create TorPolice-enhanced circuits (to be incrementally
deployable, circuit creation requests without valid capabilities are
de-prioritized in case of congestion). Then, by controlling the rate
at which a Tor client can obtain capabilities, TorPolice can explicitly
limit the client’s circuit creation rate.
7.1 Relay-Specific Capability Design
To create a three-hop TorPolice-enhanced circuit, a Tor client U
needs to obtain three capabilities, each of them being specific to
a relay on the circuit. The design of relay-specific capabilities is
identical to that of site-specific capabilities, except for the following.
(i) During pre-capability requesting, the client needs to specify
the proper pre-capability type, i.e., it is for Tor-enhanced circuit
creations. Further, to request a pre-capability specific to a relay R,
the client encloses the fingerprint of relay R (rather than any site
domain) in the set of blinded information sent to its selected AA.
(ii) Relay-specific capabilities are spendable at TorPolice-enhanced
relays (not at any sites) for creating Tor-enhanced circuits through
the relays. The relays first validate received capabilities (based on
a set of rules similar to those defined in § 6.3) before extending
circuits.
We clarify that to request pre-capabilities, Tor clients do not have
to use TorPolice-enhanced circuits to reach the AAs. Thus, there
is no deadlock for bootstrapping TorPolice. Another alternative is
pre-installing few relay-specific capabilities on Tor clients so that
using TorPolice-enhanced circuits to bootstrap the system is viable.
PolicyDefinition. Similar to site-specific capabilities, relay-specific
capabilities enable Tor to enforce access rules for its relays. In this
paper, we propose to use capabilities to control the circuit creation
rate by any Tor client so as to mitigate those aforementioned botnet
abuses against Tor. In particular, assume the following set of AAs
{A0,A1, ...,An } are deployed and authority Ai accepts a type of
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capability seed si . In this context, Tor defines its access policies as
{q0,q1, ...,qn }, where qi is the maximum rate at which a capabil-
ity seed si can request pre-capabilities (for creating Tor-enhanced
circuits) from authority Ai . Then in order to bound a Tor client’s
circuit creation rate, {q0,q1, ...,qn } should satisfy the following
condition for any attacker strategy [α0,α1, ...,αn ] where αi ∈ [0, 1]
and
∑n
i=0 αi = 1.
n∑
i=0
αi · λ · qi
3 · ci ≤ T , (5)
where λ is the cost of getting one network identity, ci is the cost
for obtaining one capability seed si and T is the maximum circuit
creation rate allowed for a client, which is a parameter controlled
by Tor. We note that the constant 3 appears in above formula since
a standard Tor circuit contains 3 relays and each of them consumes
a relay-specific capability.
To ensure the correctness of formula (5) for any attacker strategy,
we choose
qi ≤ 3 · ci · T
λ
, ∀i ∈ [0,n] (6)
Parameterization. Similar to how sites determine its access rules
using Equation (4), to compute qi , the Tor Project needs to assign
certain weights to these capability seeds. Further, a proper configu-
ration of T can be determined based on the live Tor measurements
in [42]. In particular, during an 10-minute interval, PrivCount [42]
estimates that a Tor client opens about 4 Tor circuits. Thus, the
maximum rate T at which one Tor client can create circuits should
be close to 4 per ten minutes. In practice, each AA should enforce
qi over a longer period of time (e.g., few hours) to accommodate
usage bursts and relay churn.
7.2 Capability Exchange for Tor OSes
The design of relay-specific capabilities needs to be augmented
with a capability exchange protocol to better support Tor onion
services (OSes). In particular, a Tor onion server (itself runs a Tor
client) needs to open many Tor circuits in order to serve all its
clients (referred to as OS-clients). Although a Tor hidden server can
continue to use legacy Tor circuits to serve its OS-clients, we do
design a capability exchange protocol to enable onion servers to
use TorPolice-enhanced circuits as well.
The design intuition is that a OS-client requests a new type of
capability, i.e., trans-capability, from the AAs, and sends it to the
OS, which subsequently redeems the trans-capability at the AAs
for new pre-capabilities. The trans-capability, accounted on the
capability seed of the OS-client, anonymously informs the AAs that
the hidden server needs to create a new TorPolice-enhanced circuit
to serve the OS-client. For better readability, the detailed design of
the protocol is deferred in § 13.2.
8 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we perform a formal security analysis for the impact
of TorPolice on Tor users’ anonymity. Let NT denote the set of Tor
clients that request pre-capabilities from the AAs, and subsequently
present capabilities to access service providers or Tor relays. We
first present two useful lemmas on unlinkability.
8.1 Lemmas
Lemma 8.1. Consider any client U ∈ NT . By colluding with each
other, both the AAs and a service provider W gain only negligible
advantage over random guessing when trying to link a specific Tor-
emitted site access with the client U.
Proof. We first specify the notations used in the proof. Let V
denote a Tor-emitted site access to W initiated by the Tor client
U. Note that the definition of a site access is decided byW. Let C
denote the service-specific capability that U sends toW to support
the site access V. Let P denote the pre-capability used by U to
compute C.
Since the client U can use Tor to connect to the AAs when
requesting the pre-capability P, in the ideal case, U is unlinkable
with P. However, to ensure that our lemma still holds in the worst
case when Tor’s unlinkability is broken by adversaries, we assume
the AA A˜ that issues P can link P with the client U. Thus, the
service providerW and other AAs can have such linkability as well
by colluding with A˜.
Next, we prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume that the
AAs andW can design an algorithm K that enables the AAs and
W to link the site access V with the client U. Since the site access
V is linkable with the capability C (as C is presented to the site
to support the access V) and the client U is linkable with the pre-
capability P (based on the above worst-case assumption), designing
the algorithm K is equivalent to designing another algorithm K ′
that enables the AAs andW to link the capability C with the pre-
capability P.
In TorPolice’s design, P is the blinded message signed by the
AA A˜ (i.e., the blind-signer), and C is the unblinded version of
P produced by the client U using a secret factor unknown to the
blind-signer. Thus, the problem of designing K ′ to link P with
C is the same as designing an algorithm K ′′ that allows a blind-
signer to link the blinded message it signs to the unblinded message
without knowing the secret factor, which is impossible in a blind
signature [13, 17]. This contradiction proves that the hypothetical
algorithm K does not exist, indicating both AAs andW gain only
negligible advantages of linking an specific site accessVwith client
U via collusion. We clarify this lemma does not claim that colluding
among multiple entities does not pose a risk for Tor; it only proves
that TorPolice does not introduce any further risk even if multiple
entities collude with each other. □
Using the similar reduction proof as Lemma 8.1, we can prove
the following lemma.
Lemma 8.2. Consider any client U ∈ NT . By colluding with each
other, both the AAs and Tor relays gain only negligible advantage
over random guessing when trying to link a specific relay access ( i.e.,
TorPolice-enhanced circuit creation) with client U.
8.2 Information Leakage Analysis
Given the above two lemmas, we now analyze the impact of Tor-
Police on Tor user anonymity. We measure the possible informa-
tion leakage to an arbitrary service provider W based on degree
of anonymity [23, 59]. Our analysis uses information-theoretic en-
tropy [60] as the measure of information contained in a probability
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distribution. Recall that NT denote the set of TorPolice-upgraded
Tor clients. Given an arbitrary capability-enhanced site access (i.e.,
an access supported by a valid capability), W believes that with
probability pi , the access originates from client i in NT . Thus,W
maintains a probability distribution I for all anonymous accesses.
Then, the entropy (i.e., the information contained in the distribution
I ) is defined as HW = −
∑
i ∈NT pi · log2(pi ).
Based on the unlinkability proven in Lemma 8.1, we have pi =
1
NT , whereNT is the size of the anonymity setNT . Thus, the entropy
after introducing TorPolice is
HW = log2 NT . (7)
Next, we analyze the system entropy before introducing TorPo-
lice. Let N denote the entire set of anonymous Tor clients. Notice
that the current Tor network protects W from linking a (native)
site access with a specific Tor client. Thus, given the entire anony-
mous client set N, the maximum entropy HM of the system k is
HM = log2 N , where N is the size of the anonymity set N.
Thus, based on the definition in [23, 59], the degree of anonymity
d after introducing TorPolice is
d = 1 − HM − HW
HM
=
log2 NT
log2 N
(8)
Anonymous Set Analysis. Given Equation (8), the information
leakage is determined by the size of the anonymous client set before
and after TorPolice is introduced. Therefore, once all Tor clients
are upgraded to support TorPolice, there is no information leakage
at all. Thus, eventually, TorPolice completely preserves the privacy
guarantee offered by the Tor network. To mitigate the one-time
privacy issue during the early deployment phase of TorPolice, the
Tor Project can require mandatory client upgrades from a certain
time point to “force” all active clients to serve as TorPolice initiators.
9 IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the full implementation of TorPolice.
9.1 Capability Implementation
We implement capability-related computation using C, Python and
JavaScript to consider various usage scenarios. For instance, the
capability design can be directly built into the Tor software written
in C (as shown in § 9.4), or it can be implemented as a plugin for
the Tor browser, which executes capability-related computation in
JavaScript (as shown in § 9.2). Websites may compute capabilities
using any language. Thus, we use Python as an example due to its
popularity in web applications.
We use the RSA algorithm to perform capability-related crypto-
graphic operations such as blind signing. The C implementation
uses the OpenSSL library [5] and the Python implementation im-
ports the PyCrypto module [6]. Since no standardized JavaScript
library for computing blind signatures is available, we develop our
own library based on crypto-js [4] and BigInt [2], two libraries that
allow us to perform computation (e.g.,modulo) for very large prime
numbers in JavaScript. We benchmark the capability computation
overhead in § 10.1.
The CAA Client (CapJS) Site
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: 
X-Capability
Validate the pseudonym
Unblind the pre-capability
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: 
X-Capability
Validate the capability
Response
HTTP(s) Request X-Capability: S | n | Ts | F | SA
AJAX GET X-Capability: I | {S | n | Ts | F}b
AJAX Response data: {S | n | Ts | F}b | SbA
Figure 2: TorPolice-enhanced site access by a Tor client with CapJS
installed on its browser.
9.2 Implementation of the Access Authority
For an AA accepts CAPTCHAs as capability seeds (referred to as
CAA), we implement it as a web server that deploys Google’s re-
CAPTCHA [31] service. For an AA accepts computational puzzles
(referred to as PAA), it accepts puzzle solutions over HTTP (or
HTTPs) requests. These AA servers define a customized HTTP
header (X-Capability) to carry TorPolice-related cryptographic to-
kens such as pseudonyms and pre-capabilities. To make the imple-
mentation transparent to clients (i.e., no client-end network stack
modifications are required), the AA servers add X-Capability in the
Access-Control-Allow-Headers HTTP header option.
Although Tor clients can access PAA using native HTTP libraries,
the CAA needs to be accessed using browsers. Thus, we implement
a Firefox add-on (referred to as CapJS) to execute TorPolice-related
cryptographic operations in browsers. In real-world deployment,
the add-on should be developed by trusted entities (e.g., the Tor
project) and signed by Mozilla so that Tor users can install it on
their Tor browsers.
CapJSDesign.When a Tor client connects to a CAA server, CapJS
checks cookies to determine whether a pseudonym I issued by
the same CAA server is locally cached. If so, CapJS then puts
{I | {S | n | ts F }b } into theX-Capability header, where {S | n | ts F }b
is the set of blinded information described in the pre-capability de-
sign (§ 6.1). If no pseudonym issued by the same CAA is available,
CapJS only puts the set of blinded information into the X-Capability
header. With this customized HTTP header, CapJS sends an AJAX
GET to the CAA server.
After receiving the AJAX request, the CAA server inspects the
X-Capability header. If a valid pseudonym is retrieved, the CAA
server computes a pre-capability for the client using the blinded
information carried in the header. Otherwise, the CAA server loads
a reCAPTCHA challenge page for the client. Once the challenge
is successfully solved, the CAA server computes a pre-capability
by signing the blinded information, as well as a pseudonym for
the client. These tokens are returned to the client in a JSON object
responding to the client’s AJAX GET request.
After receiving a response from the CAA server, CapJS inspects
the received data object to retrieve the pre-capability and the pseu-
donym (if applies). The pre-capability is then unblinded to produce
a capability, and the pseudonym is cached for future use.
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Figure 3: TorPolice-enhanced Tor circuit creation.
9.3 TorPolice-enhanced Site Access
To serve TorPolice-enhanced Tor clients, the deployment required at
service providers is lightweight. In particular, a site simply needs to
addX-Capability in itsAccess-Control-Allow-HeadersHTTP header
option to allow CapJS to pass site-specific capabilities in the header.
CapJS is responsible for sending capabilities to corresponding sites
if the client visits multiple TorPolice-enhanced service providers,
and potentially enforcing the capability spending policies discussed
in § 6.3, Upon receiving capability-enhanced service request, the
site verifies the received capability using the rules discussed in § 6.3
to enforce its desired access policies. Figure 2 depicts the workflow
of a site access by a client with CapJS installed on its browser.
9.4 TorPolice-enhanced Tor Circuit
We now discuss the implementation of TorPolice-enhanced Tor
circuit creation.
Tor Source Code Modification. We modify the Tor software
source code to integrate our capability design into Tor circuit cre-
ation. The native Tor circuit creation proceeds as follows. The onion
proxy (OP) on a Tor client first sends a CREATE cell containing the
first half of the Diffie-Hellman handshake to a guard relay, which
responds with a CREATED cell containing the second half of the
handshake. To extend the circuit to a new relay Re , the OP sends a
RELAY_EXTEND cell (specifying the address of Re and a new se-
cret) to the last relay Rm on the partially-created circuit. Rm copies
the received information into a new CREATE cell, and forwards the
cell to Re .
To create a capability-enhanced circuit, in addition to these orig-
inal cells, the OP further sends a valid relay-specific capability to
each hop. In our prototype, the OP prepends a capability to the
payload of the CREATE cell when connecting to the guard relay.
Capabilities for subsequent relays are prepended to corresponding
RELAY_EXTEND cells. Figure 3 illustrates the modified cell struc-
ture. Each relay first verifies the received capability based on the
rules defined in § 7.1 before processing the onionskin carried in the
remaining payload. Since capability verification is much cheaper
than the onionskin processing, this design saves the relay consid-
erable compute resources for processing bogus circuit creations
without valid capabilities. Alternatively, a relay-specific capability
can be carried via a customized cell. In this case, the cell should be
sent together with the CREATE cell (or RELAY_EXTEND cell) to
avoid additional RTTs.
To validate our implementation, we test the modified Tor source
code in Shadow [40], a safe development environment to run real
Tor source code in a private Tor network. Via log analysis, our
test experiments show that our implementation properly embeds
relay-specific capabilities into the workflow of Tor circuit creation.
Live Tor Interaction. Since live Tor relays do not run our modi-
fied Tor source code, we cannot create TorPolice-enhanced circuits
Table 1: The computational time (in microseconds) for capability-
related cryptographic operations.
Operation Mean Median Std. Dev. Language
Generation
232.0 232.0 0.1 C
253.7 253.6 0.3 Python
27,320.0 27,240.0 245.5 JavaScript
Verification
25.6 25.6 0.0 C
32.0 32.0 0.1 Python
355.5 354.3 5.3 JavaScript
Blinding
3.5 3.5 0.0 C
46.3 46.3 0.1 Python
18.1 18.1 0.3 JavaScript
Unblinding
2.4 2.4 0.0 C
7.0 7.0 0.0 Python
64.8 64.7 6.8 JavaScript
directly through live Tor relays. Thus, we implement another proto-
type to interact with live Tor relays during the capability-enhanced
circuit creation. We defer implementation details in § 13.3.
10 EVALUATION
Our evaluation centers around the following.
TorPolice Introduces Small System Overhead. We show that
capability-related operations introduce small overhead compared
with the typical Tor circuit creation latency (§ 10.1). Further, we
show that the deployment overhead of the AAs is small. For in-
stance, the AAs collectively need only 11 cores to support the entire
set of current Tor users (§ 10.2).
TorPolice Effectively Enforces Site-DefinedPolicies.Wedemon-
strate that TorPolice enables a site to effectively enforce its access
policies on anonymous Tor connections, i.e., the site can bound
service request rate by any strategic adversary via self-defined
parameters (§ 10.3).
TorPoliceMitigates Various Abuses Against Tor. Based on real
data collected by Tor, we demonstrate TorPolice can mitigate large
scale C&C abuse and prevent cell flooding attacks against the Tor
network (§ 10.4).
10.1 Capability Computation Overhead
In this section, we benchmark the overhead of capability-related
computation in C, Python and JavaScript on our testbed. All results
are obtained using a single 3.30GHz Intel i3-3120 core. We perform
10, 000 runs to learn the mean, median, and standard deviation of
the computation times for a single capability generation, verifica-
tion, information blinding and unblinding. We perform experiments
for various RSA key lengths. Results shown in Table 1 are obtained
when the RSA key length is 1024. The overall computational over-
head is small. For instance, it takes an AA ∼230 microseconds in
C to compute a pre-capability. And a single capability verification
takes ∼25 microseconds in C. A blinding and an unblinding oper-
ation by Tor clients can be finished in ∼3 and ∼2 microseconds,
respectively, in C. The implementations in C and Python have
comparable performance since PyCrypto internally wraps C code.
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Figure 4: Pre-capability release analysis. Figure 4(a) shows the num-
ber of cores required to prevent the AAs from being overwhelmed
by numerous requests. Figure 4(b) plots pre-capability release la-
tency benchmarked on our testbed.
Although it is more expensive to perform signing and verifying
in JavaScript, the overhead of blinding and unblinding operations
(performed by Tor clients) in JavaScript is comparable with other
languages. The AAs, relays and service providers can adopt more
efficient languages such as C and Python to perform capability
generation and verification.
10.2 Deployment Overhead of the AAs
In this section, we evaluate the deployment overhead of the AAs.
We first estimate the compute resources needed by the AAs to
support the pre-capability computation for all Tor users. Then we
evaluate the pre-capability issuing latency using the AAs deployed
on our testbed.
Collective Compute Resources Needed. To estimate compute
resources required from the AAs, we need to estimate the amount
of pre-capability requests from all Tor clients. Recall that each AA
server maintains two rate limiters for issuing pre-capabilities: r
for issuing site-specific pre-capabilities and q for issuing relay-
specific pre-capabilities (§ 5.2). We estimate r and q using the live
Tor measurement results in [42]. In particular, during a 10-minute
interval, PrivCount [42] estimates that each Tor client opens about
24 TCP streams and 4 circuits. Further, PrivCount [42] counts about
710, 000 unique clients during a 10-minute interval. Combing these,
we estimate the collective pre-capability request rate from all Tor
clients is about 44, 000 per second. Since it takes one core 0.23
milliseconds to issue one pre-capability, the AAs collectively need
about 11 cores to support the entire set of current Tor users.
In practice, the AAs should be over-provisioned to prevent an
adversary from overwhelming them via massive pre-capability
requests. We clarify that such flooding attack aims to exhaust
the AAs’ compute resources rather than their network bandwidth
(bandwidth-oriented volumetric DDoS attacks can be prevented by
hosting the AAs on well-provisioned cloud [49]). Figure 4(a) plots
the number of cores required in order to withstand different-sized
botnets. The results show that the AAs need about 100 cores to
withstand a 5-million node botnet.
Pre-Capability Release Latency.We now evaluate pre-capability
release latency using the AAs deployed on our testbed (§ 9.2). We
define the pre-capability release latency as the time required for an
AA server to process a pre-capability request, excluding networking
latency and other user-introduced latency (e.g., the time required
for solving challenges). We provision eight servers on our physical
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Figure 5: TorPolice enables a site to bound an adversary’s service
request rate using self-defined parameter ϵ . E0 is the adversary’s
cost at the first point of diminishing returns when the site uses the
WFQ strategy.
testbed as AA servers in this experiment. We double-threaded each
AA server so that the eight AA servers collectively have 16 cores.
To emulate pre-capability requests from the entire set of Tor users,
we develop a requester that generate requests at the rate of 44, 000
per second. To send each request, the requester randomly picks
one of the 8 AA servers. The results, plotted in Figure 4(b), show
that the pre-capability release latency is less than few milliseconds,
which is over 2 orders of magnitude smaller than the typical circuit
creation time (0.7s based on our live Tor measurements in § 13.3).
10.3 Enforcing Site-Defined Policies
In this section, we demonstrate that TorPolice enables a site to
enforce site-defined access policies for anonymous Tor connections.
As a result, a site can explicitly bound a strategic adversary’s service
request rate using self-defined parameters.
Access Policies. For evaluation purpose, we assume that the site
assigns equal weights to both types of capability seeds, i.e., c0 (for
CAPTCHA solutions) and c1 (for puzzle solutions) in Equation (4)
are the same. However, the actual costs, denoted by c ′0 and c
′
1, can
be different from c0 and c1. Further, base on the measurements
in [27, 53], we assume c ′0 is close to λ (the cost for obtaining one
network identity).
We evaluate three strategies that a site may use to define its
access policies. The first strategy (referred to as basic strategy) is
that the site accepts all Tor-emitted requests with valid capabili-
ties. In the second strategy (referred to as rate limiting strategy),
the site enforces a maximum service request rate rmax for all Tor-
emitted requests with valid capabilities. In the third strategy, be-
sides rate limiting, the site further performs weighted fair queuing
(WFQ) to serve requests: rather than serving all valid Tor-emitted
requests in one FIFO queue, requests with capabilities obtained
using CAPTCHA solutions and puzzle solutions are served in two
separate FIFO queues weighted equally. The third strategy (referred
to as WFQ strategy) prevents one type of seed from overwhelming
the other one.
Policy Enforcement. We now study an adversary’s service re-
quest rate through Tor when it invests a certain amount of money
on acquiring capability seeds. Define k = c ′0/c ′1. We first present the
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evaluation results for k = 0.5 in Figure 5 and then extend our discus-
sion to arbitrary k . For any amount of investment, the adversary’s
service request rate through Tor (denoted by ra ) is normalized to
the service request rate obtained when the adversary connects to
the site directly without using Tor.
Since c ′0<c
′
1 given k=0.5, the adversary’s optimal strategy is
spending all investment on solving CAPTCHAs. Thus, we have
ra=ϵ , where ϵ is the site-configurable parameter defined in Equa-
tion (3). When the site adopts the basic strategy, ra remains the
same as the adversary increases its investment. However, for the
other two strategies, ra will reach a point of diminishing returns as
the adversary’s investment further increases (as shown in Figure 5).
In particular, when the site adopts the rate limiting strategy, the
point of diminishing returns is reached when the collective service
request rate from the adversary and all legitimate Tor clients ex-
ceeds rmax. In Figure 5, we denote the adversary’s cost at this point
by 2E0. After that, further increasing investment actually reduces
ra since no more Tor-emitted requests are allowed by the site.
When the WFQ strategy is adopted, ra experiences two points of
diminishing returns as the adversary’s cost increases, as shown in
Figure 5. The first one happens when the collective service request
rate from all Tor clients using the optimal seed (CAPTCHAs in
this evaluation) exceeds rmax2 . After this point, the adversary has to
use sub-optimal seeds in order to further get services. As a result,
ra starts to decline from the optimal rate ϵ . The second point of
diminishing returns is reached when the collective Tor-emitted
service request rate exceeds rmax.
General Results. Our further analysis (deferred in § 13.4) proves
that for anyk , ra ≤ ϵ ifk ≤ 1 and ra ≤ k ·ϵ ifk ≥ 1. Thus, regardless
of the actual cost of obtaining capability seeds, the adversary’s
service request rate is bounded by Θ(ϵ). This result holds no matter
which strategy the site adopts and how many types of capability
seeds are accepted by TorPolice.
10.4 Mitigating Botnet Abuse Against Tor
In this section, we perform Tor-scale evaluations to demonstrate
the following.
Mitigating Botnet C&CAbuse in Tor. Based on the real data col-
lected from the large scale botnet C&C abuse against Tor happened
during Aug-Sep 2013, we show that Tor clients suffered from very
high circuit failure rates (∼40%) during the abuse. Then we demon-
strate that TorPolice effectively mitigates the abuse by reducing
failure rates by ∼74% (§ 10.4.1).
Mitigating Tor-targeted DDoS Attacks. We demonstrate that
TorPolice significantly increases Tor’s resilience against cell flood-
ing attacks that aim to paralyze the Tor network via excessive
circuit creation requests (§ 10.4.2).
Tor-scale Simulator. We aim to show that TorPolice is able to
mitigate the harm that a multi-million botnet can do to Tor. While
we do have a TorPolice implementation that runs on Shadow [40]
(see § 9.4), we would run into scalability issues with simulating
millions of Tor clients. Further, Shadow is unable to help us simu-
late the cryptographic overhead that botnets would impose on Tor
relays [39]. Due to these shortcomings, we developed our own sim-
ulator. We faithfully implement Tor’s path selection algorithm [24]
and validate the correctness of our implementation by comparing
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Figure 6: Circuit creation failure rates when Tor faced a multi-
million node botnet C&C abuse. TorPolice can reduce the average
failure rate by ∼74%.
relays’ selection probability with the ones published by Tor At-
las [10]. We sampled the computational capacity of relays from
Barbera et al.’s work that was based on live Tor measurements [14].
10.4.1 Mitigating Botnet C&C Abuse.
In this section, we study the botnet C&C abuse that happened
during Aug-Sep 2013, when Tor’s daily estimated users rapidly
increased from 1 million to 6 million. We first show that Tor clients
experienced very high circuit creation failure rates when Tor was
under this abuse. Then we show TorPolice effectively mitigates
such abuse.
Circuit Creation Failure Rate.We use the data collected by Tor
to estimate the amounts of circuit creations initiated by the bot-
net during the C&C abuse. To improve readability, we defer the
detailed mathematical modeling to § 13.5. Due to the massive cir-
cuit creations by the botnet, compute resources of many relays
are exhausted, resulting in very high circuit creation failure rates,
as depicted in Figure 6. Such high failure rates are caused by the
following vicious cycle. When the abuse starts, Tor relays begin to
drop requests due to the lack of compute resources. These initial
failures force the bot clients to continuously send requests until
their circuits are successfully created, which further increases the
network load. The resulting consequences are that the botnet still
managed to use Tor as its primary C&C channel after numerous tri-
als whereas Tor is less usable for legitimate Tor users since it could
require tens of trials before a circuit is finally created, resulting a
high user-perceived latency.
Mitigating Botnet Abuse in Tor. The root cause of such high
circuit creation failure rates is that bot clients deviate from typi-
cal Tor usage pattern, i.e., they initiate numerous circuit creation
requests without any limitation. As described in § 7.1, TorPolice al-
lows Tor to explicitly control the circuit creation by any Tor clients.
Thus, to counter this abuse, Tor sets its access policies qi such that
the maximum rate at which a client can create circuit is 4 per ten
minutes (aligned with live Tor measurements in [42]). We plot the
resulting circuit creation failure rates after enforcing the access
policies in Figure 6. Clearly, TorPolice effectively eases the network
load and reduces the average failure rate from ∼41% to ∼10%, a
∼74% reduction.
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Figure 7: Without TorPolice, a moderate-sized adversary can para-
lyze Tor via cell flooding attacks. TorPolice can effectively mitigate
this vulnerability.
In response to the C&C abuse, the Tor project released a new
version (0.2.4.17-rc) that prioritizes the processing of onionskins
using the ntor [30] protocol since the bot clients used an older
version without ntor support. Tor’s countermeasure reduced the
circuit failure ratio to about 20% [38]. We clarify that a strategic
botnet could circumvent Tor’s defense by changing adaptively (e.g.,
upgrading software). However, TorPolice offers long-term counter-
measures that can handle strategic botnets.
10.4.2 Mitigating Tor-targeted DDoS Attacks.
As noted in [37], a general concern of attacking a botnet by Tor in
case of abuse (e.g., by blacklisting its hidden servers) is that it may
lead to retaliation. For instance, a botnet can easily paralyze Tor via
excessive circuit creation requests. According to Tor design [24],
a Tor client drops its current guard relay when circuit failure rate
measured by the client is above 30%. Via massive circuit creation
requests, an adversary can easily exhaust computation resources of
the entire set of relays, driving circuit failure rates much higher than
this threshold. Figure 7 demonstrates this vulnerability: a moderate-
sized botnet with hundreds of thousands of bots is enough to cause
very high circuit failure ratios. When Tor is protected by TorPolice,
however, even a multi-million node botnet can only cause very
limited failure rates for the current Tor network (represented by
the consensus published on May 1st 2017).
11 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss closely related work.
Capabilities in the Internet. Capability schemes ([48, 49, 55, 66,
67]) have been proposed to protect the Internet from DDoS attacks.
In these approaches, capabilities specify certain traffic policing rules
and meanwhile carry cryptographic signatures to ensure correct-
ness. Victims (e.g., servers or congested routers) police traffic based
on received capabilities to stop attacks. Different from TorPolice,
Internet capability designs do not consider privacy. Further, some
of these capability schemes are difficult to deploy since they re-
quire modification of Internet core and client network stack. On the
contrary, TorPolice is readily deployable in Tor with small overhead.
Anonymous Blacklisting Systems.Anonymous blacklisting sys-
tems [35] allow service providers to maintain a “blacklist” to explic-
itly block abusive users while serving non-abusive users without
breaking anonymity. Anonymous blacklisting systems can be cate-
gorized into three broad groups: the pseudonym systems [18, 19,
22, 51, 61], the Nymble-like systems [34, 36, 45, 47, 65], and the
revocable anonymous credential systems based on zero-knowledge
proofs [16, 63, 64]. These systems either offer pseudonymity instead
of full anonymity or require a trusted or semi-trusted authority to
provide anonymity. TorPolice is not designed to be a new anony-
mous blacklisting system. Rather, TorPolice is explicitly designed
for Tor, focusing on proposing a capability-based access control
framework that allows service providers and Tor to enforce access
rules to throttle various botnet abuses while still serving legitimate
Tor users properly. Further, TorPolice’s trust is more distributed
since its AAs are fully distributed and each of them only has a
partial view of the entire system.
Relay Incentives. Tor relay incentive mechanisms [26, 29, 41, 43]
are proposed to recruit more relays for the Tor network. Gold
Star [26], BRAIDS [41] and LIRA [43] incentivize Tor clients to
relay anonymous traffic by offering them prioritized Tor services.
TorPath [29] instead pays relays Bitcoins. By allowing relays to
redeem their received relay-specific capabilities for various benefits,
TorPolice provides a general framework to support these incentive
mechanisms. For instance, to support the similar incentive mecha-
nism in [41], a relay R can redeem its received generic capabilities
to obtain “prioritized relay-specific capabilities” from the AAs. Then
R, as a client, can subsequently spend these prioritized capabilities
to create premium Tor circuits to get premium services.
12 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present TorPolice, the first privacy-preserving
access control framework that allows service providers and Tor to
enforce self-selectable access policies on anonymous Tor connec-
tions so as to throttle various botnet abuses while still providing
service to legitimate Tor users. TorPolice leverages blindly signed
network capabilities to preserve the privacy of Tor users. We imple-
ment a prototype of TorPolice, and perform extensive evaluations
to validate TorPolice’s design goals.
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Figure 8: TorPolice’s puzzle system works on the basis of P sr and P sa :
One fresh puzzle seed is released in each P sr and puzzle solutions are
redeemable at AAs for pre-capabilities only within P sa in each P sr .
13 APPENDIX
13.1 Distributed Puzzle Systems
To support puzzle solutions as capability seeds, TorPolice introduces
a distributed puzzle system for distributing computational puzzles.
Compared with prior systems (e.g., Portcullis [55]), the novelty of
TorPolice’s puzzle system is that it can explicitly bound the CPU
usage by any client for solving puzzles. In particular, legitimate
clients do not prefer to use all their CPU cycles to compute puzzles.
However, automated bots do. To enable access control, prior sys-
tems (e.g., Portcullis [55]) would need to prioritize requests based
on the difficulty level of puzzles since otherwise the bots could over-
whelm the system by solving easy puzzles. Thus, to compete with
automated bots, legitimate clients are forced to use all their CPU
cycles to solve puzzles while still at the risk of being denied access
when competing with automated bots with significant computation
resources. On the contrary, by explicitly bounding the percentage
of CPU cycles allowed for solving puzzles, TorPolice’s can bring all
bots down to the percentage that normal clients prefer to use for
puzzle computation, which significantly reduces the computation
disparity between legitimate clients and automated bots.
13.1.1 Puzzle System Overview.
All computational puzzles are computed based on a series of puzzle
seeds that are released periodically. Tor’s existing directory authori-
ties (DAs), for instance, can be used for releasing puzzle seeds. The
puzzle system works on the basis of two periods, as illustrated in
Figure 8. In each puzzle seed release period (Psr ), one fresh puzzle
seed is released at the beginning of the period and no more puz-
zle seeds will be further released in this period. The seed release
algorithm (§ 13.1.2) ensures that the puzzle seeds cannot not be
pre-computed and each valid seed requires the participance from a
majority of all DAs.
In each Psr , all puzzles are computed based on the puzzle seed
released in the current Psr . Thus, it is impossible to pre-compute
solutions for future puzzles even if the puzzle generation algorithm
(§ 13.1.3) is public. Similarly, solutions to previous puzzles cannot
be used as valid capability seeds in the current Psr . To bound a
client’s CPU usage for solving puzzles, all puzzle solutions have to
be returned to the AAs within the puzzle solution acceptance period
(Psa ). Late solutions will not be accepted. Thus, the percentage of
CPU usage for solving puzzles is bounded by Psa/Psr .
13.1.2 Puzzle Seed Release.
The puzzle seed release process requires the participation of at
least n of Tor’s DAs. n should include the majority of DAs to avoid
centralization, and meanwhile it does not need to include all DAs
to be fault-tolerant, similar to how the Tor network consensus is
released. Specifically, each DA contributes its part for puzzle seed
by generating a random nonce signed by its public key along with
a timestamp, as formulated below.
si = ni | ts | SDi , (9)
where ni is the nonce, ts is the timestamp set to the starting time
of the current Psr (e.g., t1 in Figure 8) to indicate the freshness of
the si , and SDi is the ith DA’s signature to prove the integrity of
si . To construct a puzzle seed for the current Psr , clients need to
concatenate at least n authentic seed pieces issued by n distinct DAs.
We note that Tor’s existing random value generator [33] does not
fit for TorPolice since it computes a fresh value every day whereas
TorPolice’s puzzle seeds need to be released more frequently to
improve usability, as explained in § 13.1.4.
13.1.3 Puzzle Computation.
Assume that in the kth Psr , the puzzle seed obtained by a client is
hk . Then one puzzle is computed as follows.
p = H (pstub ) = H (hk | r | s | F ), (10)
where H () is a public cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA512), r
is a random 128-bit cryptographic nonce generated by the client to
ensure the uniqueness of the puzzle, s is a 128-bit solution to the
puzzle p, and F is the fingerprint of the AA selected by the client
to redeem the puzzle solution. s is considered as a valid solution to
p only if p2L0−1 < pp , where L0 is the length of the hash function’s
output. pp is a parameter for tuning the puzzle system. We provide
detailed discussion for pp in § 13.1.6. The {hk | r | s | F } is defined
as the puzzle stub pstub , which will be sent to the AA (specified by
F ) to serve as a capability seed. Incorporating F into the puzzle
design prevents the client from redeeming a single puzzle solution
at multiple AAs.
13.1.4 Puzzle Solution Acceptance Period.
In order to be treated as valid capability seeds, puzzle stubs must
be returned to the AAs within the puzzle solution acceptation
period Psa , i.e., an AA only accepts puzzle solutions received within
[t1, t2] in the current Psr (and equivalently [t3, t4] in the next Psr ), as
illustrated in Figure 8. The slot [t2, t3] is the cool-down period, during
which no puzzle stubs are accepted. As a result, a client, regardless
of whether it is bot or a legitimate Tor user, can spend at most
P sa−Pc
P sr
<
P sa
P sr
percent of its CPU cycles on solving computational
puzzles, where Pc is the networking latency for retrieving the puzzle
seed and returning the puzzle stub to the AAs.
Because of the cool-down period in each Psr , clients who missed
the current Psa (either because they do not compute valid solutions
on time or they obtain the puzzle seed later than t2) will have to
wait until the starting of the next Psr (e.g., t3) to get another chance
to solve new puzzles. As a result, Psr needs to be small (e.g., at most
few minutes) to avoid introducing usability problems.
13.1.5 Puzzle Solution Verification.
To initiate puzzle verfication, a client sends the puzzle stub the cor-
responding AA. Upon the reception of puzzle stub, the AA performs
the following checks to validate the puzzle stub. (i) The puzzle stub
is returned within the current Psa . (ii) The puzzle stub is computed
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based on the fresh puzzle seed released in the current Psr . (iii) The
puzzle stub encloses its own fingerprint. (iv) The puzzle solution is
valid, as defined in §13.1.3. (v) The puzzle stub has not been spent
before. To enforce the fifth rule, the AA needs to cache all spent
puzzle stubs. The cache space is bounded as the AA can erase the
puzzle stubs received in previous periods since they are no longer
spendable.
13.1.6 Puzzle System Analysis.
In each Psr , the number of puzzles solved by a client follows the
following binomial distribution
Gseed ∼ B
(
pp ,
⌊
Psa − Pc
tp
⌋)
, (11)
where Gseed denotes number of solved puzzles,pp is the probability
that one attempt (i.e., a hash computation) produces a valid puzzle
solution according to the rule in § 13.1.3, tp is the amount of time
it takes for the client to attempt a single hash computation and⌊
P sa−Pc
tp
⌋
is the number of attempts U can make within the allowed
time period.
TorPolice can control pp and Psa to affect the numeric values
of Gseed . In particular, pp should be chosen such that with high
probability (i.e., 0.99) a client with slow computation speed (e.g., a
mobile device released few years ago) and slow network connec-
tion (e.g., 99th percentile of the RTT measured by CAIDA [8]) can
correctly solve one puzzle so as to produce a valid capability seed.
In particular, given that the slow device’s computation speed is t0p
and the 99th percentile network latency is P99thc , pp is selected such
that 1 − (1 − pp )N0 > 0.99, where N0 =
⌊
P sa−P 99thc
t 0p
⌋
.
13.2 Trans-Capability Design Design
In this section, we detail the capability exchange protocol discussed
in § 7.2. Since a Tor orion server (itself runs a Tor client) needs
to open many Tor circuits in order to serve all its clients (i.e., OS-
clients) via TorPolice-enhanced circuits, enforcing per-seed rate
limiting for pre-capability release may limit the availability of Tor
OSes. To address this issue, we design the following capability
exchange protocol.
In particular, a OS-client needs to request a new type of capability,
i.e., trans-capability, from the AAs. During the hidden service set up
process, along with the information about Rendezvous Point, the
OS-client sends a trans-capability to one of the OS’s Introduction
Points. The OS subsequently redeems the trans-capability at the
AAs for new pre-capabilities, which can be used for generating new
relay-specific capabilities. The trans-capability, accounted on the
capability seed of the OS-client, anonymously informs the AAs that
the OS needs to create a new circuit to serve the OS-client.
Trans-capability Computation. Each trans-capability is com-
puted based on pre-trans issued by the AAs. By default, all Tor
clients request pre-trans to prevent the AAs from knowing whether
a client has the intention to visit OSes. Clients that do not visit any
OS simply ignore the received pre-trans. To request pre-trans, the
OS-client sends {ς | n | ts }b to the AAs, where ς is a pre-defined
system value for trans-capability. No information about the OS
is enclosed to protect the OS’s privacy. The AAs then compute
blind signatures over the information to produce a pre-trans. Fi-
nally, the OS-client unblinds the received pre-trans to produce a
trans-capability.
Redeeming Trans-capability. The process of redeeming trans-
capability is identical to how a Tor client requests relay-specific
pre-capabilities using its capability seed (the trans-capability now
serves as a new capability seed). The AAs reject all unauthentic,
expired or spent trans-capabilities.
13.3 Live Tor Interaction
In this section, we continue our discussion in § 9.4 for live Tor
network interactive.
CIRC event
new_circuit
OP
RelayManager
extend_circuit
Figure 9: The design of RelayManager.
RelayManager Design. Since the live Tor relays are capability-
agnostic (i.e., they do not run our modified Tor source code de-
scribed in § 9.4), we cannot create TorPolice-enhanced Tor circuits
directly through live Tor relays. Thus, we implement another pro-
totype to interact with live Tor relays during capability-enhanced
circuit creation. The prototype relies on the Tor control protocol [7].
In particular, on the OP, we implement a RelayManager based on
the Stem [44] library to execute the capability-related operations, as
illustrated in Figure 9. The RelayManager controls the OP’s circuit
creation to “embed” capabilities into live Tor circuit creations. In
particular, after the OP selects relays for its circuit. the RelayMan-
ager blinds relay information, requests pre-capabilities from our
deployed AAs described in § 9.2, and then computes relay-specific
capabilities. Whenever the OP’s partially-built circuit reaches a re-
lay Rn in the live Tor network, the RelayManager receives a CIRC
event callback from the Tor control protocol. As Rn is capability-
agnostic, we offload capability verification to the RelayManager.
Upon validation, the RelayManager sends an extend_circuit com-
mand through the Tor control protocol to continue circuit creation.
Otherwise, the RelayManager terminates circuit creation by issuing
a close_circuit command.
We clarify that RelayManager should not be used in real-world
deployment since the capability verification is offloaded to the OP.
Rather, to securely embrace TorPolice, the Tor relay source code
needs to be modified properly, as proposed in § 9.4.
Latency Measurement. To validate the design of RelayManager,
we instruct our Tor clients to create circuits through live Tor relays
and use RelayManager to embed our capability-related operations
into the creation process. Meanwhile, we measure circuit creation
latencies to quantify the overhead caused by the our capability de-
sign. Figure 10 plots the CDF of measured latency with and without
relay-specific capabilities. The results show that TorPolice intro-
duces negligible overhead. This is because a capability verification
operation merely takes ∼0.03 milliseconds (§ 10.1) whereas the
median time for creating a (native) Tor circuit is ∼0.7s. We clarify
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Figure 10: TorPolice introduces negligible overhead during
capability-enhanced Tor circuit creation.
that since the capability verification is offloaded from live Tor re-
lays to the OP, there could be some marginal errors in our latency
measurements since live Tor relays may simultaneously process
multiple circuits requests.
13.4 Enforcing Site-Defined Policies
In this section, we continue the analysis in § 10.3 to prove that an
adversary’s service request rate ra is always bounded by Θ(ϵ). In
particular, when k ≤ 1, CAPTCHA solutions are the optimal seeds
since c ′0 < c
′
1. Therefore, the optimal ra is obtained when the ad-
versary spends all investment on purchasing CAPTCHA solutions.
Thus we have ra = ϵ . When k ≥ 1, solutions to computational
puzzles become the optimal seeds. In this case, the adversary’s opti-
mal ra is k · ϵ which is obtained by investing all money on solving
computational puzzles.
When the site adopts the basic strategy (i.e., accepts all Tor-
emitted requests with valid capabilities), the adversary can contin-
uously use optimal capability seeds to maintain its optimal ra as its
investment increases. However, if either the rate limiting strategy
or the WFQ strategy is adopted, the adversary will reach a point
of diminishing returns when the site no longer accepts service re-
quests using capabilities that are obtained via the optimal seeds. As
a result, the adversary’s ra starts to drop from the optimal value.
Thus, regardless of k and the site’s strategy, ra is always bounded
by Θ(ϵ). The above analysis can be easily extended to more types
of capability seeds.
13.5 Modeling for Botnet C&C Abuse
In this section, we continue the discussion in § 10.4.1 to detail
the mathematical modeling for estimating the amount of circuit
creation requests in Tor when Tor was under the large scale C&C
abuse happened in September 2013.
We collect the Tor network consensus published from September
1 to September 30, 2013 when the number of estimated daily Tor
users ranged from 4 million to 6 million. Since one consensus file
is published in each hour, we use the average statistics from all 24
consensus files published in a day to represent the Tor status in
that day. We model the relay computation capacity based on the
live Tor relay measurements in [14] by uniformly sampling their
measurement numbers, excluding the samples with low confidence
(as defined in their paper).
The number of circuit creation requests received by Tor is mod-
eled by a Poisson Process with arrival rate λ. To compute λ, we first
estimate the number of unique Tor clients in a time interval and
then estimate the number of circuits opened by each client in the
same interval. Mathematically, we have λ = N1 ·r1+N2 ·r2t0 , where N1
and N2 are the number of unique legitimate clients and bot clients,
respectively, over the time interval t0; r1 and r2 are the average
number of circuit creations requested by a legitimate client and a
bot client, respectively, over the same interval t0. N1 and N2 can
be estimated using the metric inferred from live Tor measurements
in [42]. In particular, over a 10-minute interval, PrivCount [42]
counts 710 unique clients when Tor’s daily estimated user count is
1.75 million, which indicates the client population turnover rate ρ is
about 2.5. Since the methodology used by Tor to estimate its daily
user has not changed since 2013, we assume that ρ obtained in 2016
is also applicable in 2013. Thus, over a 10-minute interval, we have
N1 = N L1 /ρ and N2 = (NT2 − N L1 )/ρ, where N L1 and NT2 are the
number of legitimate daily users and total daily users estimated
by Tor, respectively. We estimate N L1 as 1 million, which was the
estimated daily Tor user number right before the abuse started in
August 2013. NT2 can obtained directly from the data published by
Tor [11]. Further, PrivCount [42] counts about 4 circuits opened
for each Tor client over a 10-minute interval, thus we estimate r1
is about 4 in a 10-minute interval, assuming that legitimate Tor
clients had the same usage pattern in 2013 as they have in 2016.
However, the above usage pattern inferred from [42] cannot
be applied to determine r2 since bot clients may have different
usage patterns from legitimate clients. Thus, we estimate r2 using
historical data. In particular, we find that the highest circuit creation
failure rate on September 27 2013 is about 35% [38]. Then using the
network consensus of the same day, r2 is estimated at about 150
over a 10-minute interval.
Based on the above mathematical modeling, we study the circuit
creation failure rates using our Tor-scale simulator. The results are
plotted in Figure 6.
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